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Private Information and the Deterrent
Effect of Antitrust Damage Remedies
JONATHAN B. BAKER
Dartmouth College
1. INTRODUCTION
The private treble damages remedy for antitrust violations allows the victim
to collect triple the overcharge from the antitrust violator. This remedy is
intended to deter antitrust violations, compensate victims, and prevent the
unjust enrichment of lawbreakers. Critics contend, though, that it deters the
creation of joint ventures that would produce large social cost savings, and
that the haphazard nature of compensation is unfair to victims as a class.
In this article I evaluate systematically the allocative consequences of the
set of possible private antitrust damages remedies, including treble damages,
with a partial equilibrium model. Both buyer (victim) and seller (violator)
are modeled as optimizing actors in a world where the prospect of a successful
private antitrust damages action is uncertain. The model recognizes the im-
portance of ancillary social benefits arising from anticompetitive actions.
Anticompetitive seller behavior is deterred by the prospect of antitrust dam-
The author is indebted to A. Mitchell Polinsky, Timothy F Bresnahan, Steven C. Salop,
and the Law and Economics Program, Stanford Law School. This paper is a revised version of
an earlier work that discusses these issues in more detail. Stephen Salant independently derived
some of the results presented here.
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ages, and the prospect of a damage recovery induces buyers to increase
purchases from antitrust violators.'
The major innovation of this article is in the analysis of antitrust damage
remedies when buyer and seller may have private information concerning
the likelihood of a successful antitrust recovery (cartel detection and convic-
tion). The model demonstrates that the deterrent effect of antitrust damages
depends crucially upon the extent of private information. When the buyer
treats his antitrust recovery as a windfall, the polar assumption adopted in
previous economic analyses of antitrust damages, damages have some deter-
rent effect. In the opposite polar case, in which buyer and seller have the
same ex ante assessment of the probability of successful antitrust enforcement
by buyer against a seller cartel, as would occur if private information were
revealed completely by market prices, this article proves a remarkable result:
resource allocation under the private antitrust damages system is no different
from resource allocation in the absence of antitrust law. Without information
differences the private antitrust damage remedy neither deters cartel for-
mation nor gives cartels an incentive to alter output from the monopoly level.
The preexisting relationship between buyer and seller allows them to contract
around the damage remedy when they anticipate the possibility of harm.
In this article I also show how the efficient private damage remedy varies
with the extent of private information. The efficient remedy is the damage
rule that leads to efficient resource allocation under decentralized buyer and
seller decision making. The efficient remedy charges the violator the net
harm to victims when the buyer has no private information and never expects
to be successful in an antitrust action against the seller. That well-known
result is generalized by deriving the efficient remedy when both parties are
allowed to possess private information and when information is revealed
through prices.
2. RESOURCE ALLOCATION UNDER
THE PRIVATE DAMAGES REMEDY
In the absence of antitrust law, sellers in the same industry will coordinate
both production and pricing. The model presented in this article assumes
that sellers act anticompetitively through a price-fixing cartel. The exploita-
tion of seller market power in other forms could, however, be studied simi-
larly through redefinition of notation. In the discussion below, the seller will
1. The buyer's prelitigation incentive to view an expected damage recovery as a reduction
in the effective price charged by a cartel was first suggested in the antitrust context (but not
modeled) by William Breit and Kenneth Elzinga (1974: 340 n.30), who termed it a "perverse
incentive." William Landes has derived the efficient damage remedy for the case in which victim
behavior can be ignored. Michael Block, Frederick Nold, and J. Gregory Sidak have presented
an empirical analysis of the deterrent effect of public antitrust enforcement, but do not take
into account the behavior of both violator and victim. Economic research on antitrust damages
is surveyed by William Breit and Kenneth Elzinga (1985).
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be treated as a single actor who behaves either competitively or coopera-
tively. The buyer may be thought of as a representative consumer, although
most of the results require no more strict an assumption than that individual
buyer demand curves aggregate into a downward sloping market demand
curve. 2 In order to focus on the effects of differential buyer and seller infor-
mation, the model ignores litigation costs and the possibility that parties may
choose to settle their dispute before a verdict is reached.3
2. 1. PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
Under a system of private antitrust enforcement, the buyer can recover dam-
ages MM(X,P,C,J) from the seller by proving seller collusion. This expression
is an arbitrary function, determined by antitrust law, of all variables a court
may observe, including equilibrium industry output (X), equilibrium price
(P), the cost of producing the given output by firms acting alone (C), and
the cost savings achieved through production coordinated among sellers (J).
In the model described below, the equilibrium price and both cost variables
are functions of output, so the damage remedy can be treated as a function
of output alone with no loss of generality, and will be written as/MM(X).
Under the familiar "treble damages" function, M(X) represents the seller's
overcharge of the buyer, and the constant M is the multiple three. The dam-
age base M(X) must always be positive, as antitrust law does not force victims
to subsidize anticompetitive sellers. The overcharge typically falls as a cartel
increases output from the monopoly output toward the efficient level. Hence
marginal damages MM' are likely negative in the range between monopoly
and efficient outputs.
Although time does not explicitly appear in the model, two time periods
are implicit. In the first, the buyer purchases the seller's output. Later, the
buyer may sue the seller under the antitrust laws. 4 At the time of the pur-
chase, a future antitrust recovery is an uncertain contingency with some
probability of occurrence. That probability depends upon both buyer detec-
tion of anticompetitive activity and successful judicial enforcement. The func-
tion 0( ) represents the buyer's ex ante subjective probability of a future
damage recovery (detection and conviction). Similarly, the function 0( )
represents the seller's ex ante subjective probability of future damage pay-
ments to the buyer. The buyer and seller are assumed to be risk neutral.
The seller is the most likely candidate to have private information, as he
can hide the presence of a cartel from the buyer. Whenever the seller has
2. Welfare comparisons are made using the consumer's surplus, though, implicitly ignoring
income effects if the buyer is a consumer.
3. The model also assumes that only overcharged buyers bring private suits.
4. The buyer's damage recovery from the seller is assumed to be adjusted by the appropriate
opportunity cost of capital so that neither buyer nor seller expects to gain or suffer from the
delay.
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private information concerning his own anticompetitive activities, the buyer
will not assess a future damage recovery as more likely than the seller will
conjecture. Hence, the discussion below assumes that the buyer's probability
assessment is never greater than the seller's (0 -- 0 -- 0 < 1).
The buyer's and seller's probability assessments are both endogenous in
the model, determined entirely by observable variables. With no loss of
generality, they are assumed to vary with output alone: O(X) and O(X). The
endogeneity of each party's probability assessment could arise from the tech-
nology by which the cartel's victim detects and convicts the seller of an
antitrust violation. If the buyer is willing to spend more resources to inves-
tigate seller behavior when the appropriated consumer's surplus is greatest,
or if courts are more likely to convict the seller of an antitrust violation when
the overcharge is large, then the probability of cartel detection and conviction
will rise as the cartel reduces output.5 Under this "overt behavior" expla-
nation for endogeneity of the probability of detection and conviction, both
the buyer's and the seller's marginal probability assessments will be negative:
0'(X) < 0 and 0'(X) < 0.6
Alternatively, the probability of cartel detection and enforcement may vary
with output through each party's ability to learn the other's private infor-
mation by observing market behavior. 7 In the present model the only way
for the parties to learn each other's private information is by inference
through observing changes in the one independent equilibrium variable,
either output or price. It is therefore a completely general representation of
buyer and seller learning to postulate that both the buyer's and the seller's
subjective probability assessments are functions of output.
Under one plausible updating rule for combining this learning with each
party's prior probability assessment to generate a posterior probability as-
sessment, each subjective probability estimate will fall as output falls. Ac-
cording to this description of what will be termed the "shared information"
model, 0'(X) > 0 and 0'(X) > 0. The updating rule assumes that, having
observed output X, the buyer creates his posterior probability O(X) as a linear
5. A variant of this story assumes that cartels become easier to detect as the joint cost
savings they achieve increase, because cooperation requires observable changes in the physical
production process. According to this view, the seller would have an incentive to alter cooper-
ative production technology in a technically inefficient manner in order to hide the presence of
coordinated seller activity. As the model emphasizes the allocative inefficiencies arising from
antitrust damages, it ignores this incentive; technical efficiency is assumed throughout.
6. Other cartel detection technologies could lead to non-negative marginal probabilities.
For example, if buyers infer the existence of a seller cartel only when they observe an outbreak
of competition, the marginal probability of detection might not vary negatively with shifts in
seller output.
7. It is well known that private information may be revealed by market behavior. (Grossman
and Stiglitz, 1976, 1980; Radner: 108-09). This article does not make explicit the informational
structure of private beliefs, the process (Bayesian, for example) by which beliefs are updated,
the nature of new information, or the timing of its revelation. The existence of an informational
equilibrium is assumed.
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combination of his prior probability estimate and his inference of the seller's
probability O(X). If output rises, the buyer infers that the seller is trying to
reduce damages because the seller's probability estimate is high, and the
buyer raises his own probability estimate in response. Similarly, the seller
increases his own subjective probability estimate when output rises, through
learning that the buyer's estimate is high by observing the buyer's increase
in demand. Without imperfect information, that is, excluding the possibility
of endogeneity from either "overt behavior" or "shared information," both
probabilities will be exogenous constants (0' = 0' = 0), and the buyer's
and seller's probability assessments can differ systematically.
The buyer has an underlying willingness to pay function R(X), derived
from preference maximization. 8 R(X) would be the market (inverse) demand
curve in the absence of antitrust. When the buyer is able to collect antitrust
damages, he views his expected damage recovery 6(X)1uM(X) as a reduction
in the effective price he must pay the seller. The expected price to the buyer
is less than the market price P(X) by an amount equal to the buyer's expected
per unit damage recovery O(X),uM(X)/X. 9 The buyer equates this expected
price with his underlying true willingness to pay per unit, R(X). Hence the
following relation obtains between the market price P(X) and the buyer's
underlying preferences R(X):
P(X) = R(X) + 6(X)MM(X)/X (1)
Seller revenues per unit sold equal the market price P(X). Seller profits,
defined in equation (2), are reduced by the seller's expected damage payment
to the buyer. The expression C(X) - J(X) represents the seller's production
costs, where J(X) represents cost savings on account of coordinated produc-
tion. J(X) is zero if individual sellers do not coordinate production, or if that
production generates no cost savings.
n = P(X)X - [C(X) - J(X)] - O(X)uM(X) (2)
Equation (3) incorporates buyer behavior (1) into the definition of seller
profits. The arguments of the functions have been suppressed.
8. The implicit preference function that allows R(X) to depend on the seller's output alone,
and not on consumption of other goods or income, is quasi-linear in the seller's output. For a
consumer good, this in effect assumes that the income elasticity of demand for X is zero and
that consumer's surplus is an exact welfare measure. If X is an intermediate good, the buyer
would be interpreted as a downstream firm with derived demand R(X) for the output of an
upstream seller.
9. The market demand curve is derived in the usual way from the preference maximization
of many buyers, each taking the market price as given and each taking the expected per unit
damage recovery as given. Hence in aggregate the buyer treats the expected per unit damage
recovery as a constant. The market price is thus the willingness to pay of the marginal buyer,
who receives an average amount of damages if buyers as a group successfully challenge the
seller cartel in court.
390 / JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS, AND ORGANIZATION IV:2, 1988
;r = Rx - (C -J) + (o - (3)
The equilibrium output under the private antitrust damage remedy, X",
is implicitly determined by the first-order condition (4), derived by maxi-
mizing profits (3) with respect to output.
X, s.t. R + XR' - (C -J)' = (0 - ),uM' + (0' - O')/uM (4)
The seller exploits market power so long as it is profitable to do so. Convexity
of the profit function is assumed. 10 Profits are constrained not to be negative.
The damage remedy forces the seller to balance his desire to maximize
pre-antitrust law profits with a desire to minimize expected damage pay-
ments; these are the two elements of profits in equation (3). First-order
condition (4) shows how that balance is striuck. The left-hand expression is
the difference between the marginal revenue and marginal cost curves that
would obtain in the absence of antitrust. If this expression is negative, equi-
librium output will exceed the monopoly output. The two right-hand expres-
sions incorporate different influences of antitrust damages on buyer and seller
behavior. The first expression reflects the direct effect of the seller's damage
payment to the buyer in raising seller marginal cost: seller marginal cost
increases by the seller's expected net marginal damage payment net of the
buyer's expected marginal damage recovery. " This term will likely be less
than zero, as marginal damages are negative in the range between the mo-
nopoly and efficient outputs, and the buyer's probability assessment does not
exceed the seller's. Hence the direct effect of antitrust damages will tend to
raise seller marginal cost, lead the seller to increase output above the mo-
nopoly output, and deter anticompetitive conduct to some extent. The second
right-hand expression reflects an indirect influence of antitrust damages on
buyer and seller. The buyer and seller recognize that changes in output alter
the enforcement probability and thus affect expected damages. The sign of
this expression will depend upon the signs and relative sizes of 0' and 0'.
The equilibrium output will be compared to three other output levels:
monopoly, efficient, and competitive outputs. The monopoly output X m, im-
plicitly defined in equation (5), is the equilibrium output in the absence of
antitrust law.
Xms.t. R + XR' - (C -J)' = 0 (5)
10. The second order conditions rule out sharply increasing returns to scale under the
overcharge damages remedy defined below.
11. The portion of the seller's gross expected marginal damage payment that the buyer
anticipates recouping affects the market price through equation (1) without altering expected
seller profits, so it does not affect the equilibrium output.
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Without antitrust law both total and marginal damage payments (uM and
#M') are zero. Hence equation (5) may be derived by setting the right-hand
expression of equation (4) equal to zero.
The efficient output X0 is defined in equation (6).
XO s.t. R = (C - J)' (6)
At the efficient output seller achieves all economies of joint production but
does not exercise market power. The competitive output Xc is defined in
equation (7). At the competitive output the seller acts as a price taker but
does not coordinate production among firms to achieve cost economies.
Xc s.t. R = C' (7)
Figure 1 depicts the relation between the efficient, competitive, and mo-
nopoly outputs when marginal cost is rising. The efficient output must always
be the largest, but the relative size of the competitive and monopoly outputs
p
(C-'
Xm XC Xo
Figure 1. Monopoly, competitive, and efficient outputs when marginal cost is rising.
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depends on the extent of joint cost savings and on the elasticities of demand
and supply.
This article highlights the differing effects of two extreme informational
assumptions on equilibrium output. At the time the buyer contracts for the
seller's product or service, the parties are uncertain about whether the buyer
recognizes that the seller is acting anticompetitively and whether the buyer
would be successful in a private antitrust action against the seller (because
of the difficulties of proof). If the buyer has the same information as the
seller about the seller's violation and the buyer's prospects of success in court,
then the buyer is termed "informed." If instead the buyer acts as if the seller
were not violating the antitrust laws, or if the buyer assigns a probability of
zero to the likelihood of a successful damages action, then the buyer is termed
"uninformed."12
1. Informed Buyer. The assumption that the buyer is informed restricts
both the levels and the derivatives of O(X) and O(X). When the buyer has
identical information as the seller, both will arrive at the same subjective
probability point estimate as to the likelihood of successful antitrust enforce-
ment (0 = 0). Further, with identical information each party will interpret
a change in output the same way (0' = 0').
The informed buyer case could arise in at least two plausible ways. First,
if the buyer and seller exchange information through marketplace behavior
so that no private information remains, the two parties will assess the prob-
ability of seller detection and conviction identically. Further, if the buyer
and seller are capable of learning each other's subjective probability assess-
ment, they are capable of learning the function by which that probability is
adjusted, so their marginal probability assessments will also be equal.
Alternatively, even if the parties are unable to learn each other's private
information through observing market output, it is possible that neither
buyer nor seller possesses any private information. Industry participants nec-
essarily share a great deal of knowledge about industry activity, and the buyer
and seller will probably hold similar views about the general nature of anti-
trust enforcement. If they do not learn from each other but possess identical
information, they are likely to react identically to output changes in updating
their probability assessments.
Under the assumption of an informed buyer, first-order condition (4) is
identical to condition (5), which defines the monopoly output. This equiva-
lence means that when buyers are informed, cartels choose the monopoly
output regardless of the damage rule. 13 Further, the profit constraint on seller
12. The intermediate "less informed" buyer case, where buyer and seller's ex ante proba-
bility assessments differ but buyer recognizes that there is some prospect of a future damage
recovery, is analyzed in an earlier work (Baker).
13. An alternative proof proceeds from the definition (3) of seller profits when a private
damage remedy exists. If 0 = 0, then ;r = RX - (C - J), regardless of M. Hence seller's
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behavior is never binding, regardless of the damage remedy: when 0 = 0,
profits (3) reduce to the non-negative expression RX - (C - J). This result
means that sellers exploit all possible opportunities for anticompetitive ac-
tivity, and no cartels are deterred by being made unprofitable. These im-
portant observations are stated as Theorem 1.14
Theorem 1. When buyers are informed, all cartels choose the monopoly
ouput and no cartels are deterred, regardless of the damage rule.
Three explanations will be provided for the surprising result in
Theorem 1. First, the damage rule has no effect on equilibrium output be-
cause both buyer and seller base their quantity decisions on the price net of
the expected damage award per unit. When buyers have the same infor-
mation as sellers, both parties discount the observed market price by the
identical average value of damages. They in effect see through the expected
damage award to condition their behavior on the same net price. Hence they
act as if antitrust damages did not exist: the net price equals the monopoly
price and the monopoly output is produced and sold. Only if the two parties
treat the observed market price as generating different expected net prices
will the equilibrium level of output alter from the equilibrium in the absence
of antitrust.
The second explanation comes from thinking of the damage remedy as a
per unit transfer of uM/X from seller to buyer, much like a tax on a monopolist
later rebated to consumers. 5 The market price P(X) received by the seller
increases by precisely the amount needed to undo the expected transfer.'6
Both seller and buyer base their market behavior on the expected post-
transfer price R(X), which is equated to the monopoly price in the equilib-
rium. Because the expected post-transfer price is the monopoly price, the
resulting equilibrium output equals the monopoly output. Increasing the
damage function uM, as by raising the damage multiple, raises the market
price without affecting the expected post-transfer price, expected monopoly
profits, or the equilibrium output level.
The final explanation is depicted in figure 2. In this diagram, R is the
demand curve in the absence of antitrust, based on underlying preferences.
profits are unaffected by antitrust damages. By maximizing profits when a damage remedy exists
under the assumption that the buyer is informed, the seller is in effect maximizing profits in
the absence of antitrust, and he therefore chooses the monopoly output.
14. Another equilibrium is possible in the informed buyer case if the market price P is an
arbitrary scalar rather than determined by the demand function P(X). In this implausible sit-
uation, the efficient output is the equilibrium regardless of the market price.
15. Although the rate of the per unit transfer uM(X)IX varies with the equilibrium output,
buyer is a price taker so acts as if the equilibrium per unit transfer uM(X')fX' is constant.
16. Therefore, contrary to Landes (676), if consumers anticipate recovery for seller's over-
charge, this does not eliminate the deadweight loss when seller equally anticipates paying
damages.
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P(Xm) (C-J)'+ ujjM'+ e'juM
R(Xm)
P= R + ejjM/X
R+XR' P+XP'=
R+ XR'+ ej M'+ e'4pM
Xm
Figure 2. Effect of private antitrust damages when buyers are informed.
The prospect of a private damage recovery shifts the buyer's demand curve
to P. The seller's marginal revenue curve shifts in response, from R + XR'
to P + XP'. The seller's marginal cost curve also rises, however, with the
prospect of a future antitrust damage payment, from (C - J)' to (C - J)'
+ OjuM' + O'/uM. When the buyer is informed, so 0 = 0 and 0' = 0',
the expected damage payment increases the seller's marginal revenue by the
same amount as it increases his marginal cost. Thus, a profit-maximizing
seller chooses the monopoly output X" regardless of the antitrust damage
rule. 11
Theorem 1 implies that when buyers are informed, the private antitrust
damage system is an unattractive mechanism for enforcing competition pol-
icy. It deters no cartels, yields no efficiency gains, and in an expected sense
fails to generate compensation to victims or to prevent the unjust enrichment
of antitrust violators. When the buyer and seller have identical information,
the market subverts the best intentions of lawmakers.18
17. Price rises in figure 2 by more than the increase in marginal cost, as is plausible in this
model. Yet the seller cannot profit by expanding output above the monopoly output, because
marginal revenue does not rise by more than the increase in marginal cost.
18. Theorem 1 depends importantly on the often plausible assumption of buyer and seller
risk neutrality. If the parties are instead risk averse, however, when recovery is uncertain, a
given level of expected antitrust damages is a greater threat to the seller and provides a smaller
benefit to the buyer. Risk aversion makes the parties treat the identical level of expected damages
PRIVATE INFORMATION AND ANTITRUST DAMAGE REMEDIES / 395
2. Uninformed Buyer. In the second extreme case, the uninformed
buyer case, the buyer treats the damage recovery as a windfall, acting at the
time he is purchasing goods as if his subjective probability of detection and
conviction were always zero (0 = 0' = 0). It is sensible to presume that the
buyer is uninformed if seller cartels are typically difficult for him to detect
when in operation but are susceptible to breaking down in a manner that
makes their previous existence obvious to the buyer. 19 Alternatively, the un-
informed buyer case may represent a hypothetical enforcement regime in
which there are no private damages actions but the government can collect
damages in a civil damages action.
2.2. OVERCHARGE REMEDIES (INCLUDING TREBLE DAMAGES)
One particular damage remedy deserves special attention: the overcharge
calculation applied under present antitrust law. The seller pays a multiple Y
of the overcharge, where the overcharge M equals the cartel's price markup
times the number of units sold.
In the analysis below, the overcharge will be computed as a markup over
the actual (monopolist's) marginal cost ((C -J)'), as indicated in equation (8). 20
M = [P - (C - J)'X (8)
Under current law the damage multiple/p is three.21
Figure 3 depicts the effect of overcharge damages on the seller's profit
differently, removing the symmetry underlying Theorem 1 and thereby generating some deter-
rent effect for private damages. This effect of risk aversion will increase as the stakes rise or
the probability of detection and conviction falls. Hence under risk aversion, an increased damage
multiple is likely to increase the deterrent effect of the private damages remedy.
The result in Theorem 1 also depends on the assumption that litigation costs can be ignored,
and that the antitrust case will proceed to a judgment rather than a settlement. If litigation
costs are substantial and a party can affect the probability of conviction by increasing expenses
on litigation, then litigation expenditures should be treated as an additional decision variable.
In this case a seller with market power can purchase increased output reduction ex ante by
making credible a commitment of more resources to future litigation, and a buyer can obtain a
lower net price ex ante by making credible a commitment of more resources to future litigation.
Further, the welfare comparison of alternative damage rules would recognize litigation costs as
social costs. Moreover, the possibility of settlement increases the variance of both the damage
level and litigation costs, reducing the value of a given expected award to risk averse parties.
19. A similar situation might arise in the present system of mixed public and private antitrust
enforcement if the buyer discovers the existence of a seller cartel only when the government
brings an enforcement action.
20. An alternative algorithm is also employed in antitrust law for measuring the overcharge.
That approach computes the overcharge as a markup over the marginal cost that would have
obtained, had the seller been acting as a competitor (C' (X1)). The two overcharge algorithms
are identical if marginal cost is constant and there are no social cost savings from joint produc-
tion. The results presented in the text do not change markedly if the alternative overcharge
calculation is employed (Baker).
21. The multiple equals one in two special cases: when the government is the victim of
seller's anticompetitive activity or when the seller is a research and development joint venture.
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$ expected damages
pre-antitrust law
I
/expected damages
under conditions
of Theorem 2
Xd  Xm Xe
Figure 3. Effect of overcharge damages on seller profits.
maximization.u The pre-antitrust law profits curve is maximized at the mo-
nopoly output. Expected overcharge damages are maximized at an output
Xd, not in general equal to the monopoly output. Expected damages likely
fall as the cartel increases output above the monopoly output. Net profits
under antitrust law, the difference between the curves, are maximized at
the equilibrium output Xe.
1. Profit Constraint.. Seller behavior under overcharge damages is af-
fected significantly by the constraint that profits not be negative. With over-
charge damages the effect of the profit constraint can be approximated by
the condition that the buyer's and seller's detection probabilities not exceed
the inverse of the damage multiple. 23 If detection probabilities are higher
22. Under overcharge damages, the market demand curve rotates relative to underlying
preferences and grows steeper. This can be seen from the reduced form expression for market
demand implied by equations (1) and (8): P = [R - Ou(C -J)']/(1 - 8u). The buyer increases
his market demand the most when the seller's overcharge is greatest, as then his potential
damage recovery is maximized. The rotation occurs at the point where the underlying demand
curve equals marginal cost at the efficient output, as that is where market demand P is equated
to underlying preferences R.
23. This is a good approximation when average production costs are roughly constant (Baker:
22-4).
PRIVATE INFORMATION AND ANTITRUST DAMAGE REMEDIES / 397
than this level, the expected damage function will be uniformly greater than
the pre-antitrust law profit function. Then no cartel output will be profitable
and cartel formation will be deterred. As a result, with overcharge damages
only those cartels with probability assessments less than the inverse of the
damage multiple will form. Intuitively, with overcharge damages a high dam-
age multiple makes overt cartels-those with the best chance of detection-
unprofitable, deterring their formation.24
2. Benchmark Non-Deterrence Conditions.. To understand the effects
of overcharge damages on cartel behavior when cartel formation is not de-
terred by the profit constraint, it is useful to begin by identifying sufficient
conditions such that overcharge damages do not cause the cartel to alter
output from the monopoly level it would choose in the absence of antitrust.
Deterrence of inefficient cartel behavior then would occur entirely through
the operation of the profit constraint.
Theorem 2. Assume the buyer is uninformed and the overcharge antitrust
damage remedy is employed. A cartel not deterred by the profit constraint
will choose the monopoly output if marginal production cost is constant
and the seller's probability assessment is exogenous.25
This result arises because the overcharge damage remedy function resem-
bles the pre-antitrust law profit function under the assumptions of constant
marginal cost, exogenous detection probability, and an uninformed buyer.
Theorem 2 holds even though the damage remedy is less than the profit
function at all output levels because, as depicted by the dashed curve in
figure 3, the two functions rise and fall in tandem. In consequence, the
overcharge damage remedy acts like a tax on economic profit, reducing the
seller's profit without altering his profit-maximizing output.26
24. This deterrence may be a mixed blessing. Those cartels which remain undeterred by
overcharge damages when the buyer is uninformed may well be the worst of all possible cartels
in terms of their welfare effects. For example, suppose the horizontal arrangements most easily
detected and convincted are those producing social cost savings. This could occur if joint pro-
duction cost savings require readily observable alterations in the production process, whereas
price fixing must be inferred from changes in price alone. When the overcharge damage multiple
is high, then, cartels not producing social cost savings are likely to form while beneficial joint
ventures are likely to be deterred.
25. Proof: When the buyer is uninformed and overcharge damages are employed, the first
order condition is:
[R + XR' - (C - J)'(1 -p) = -pOX(C - J)" + 'uX[R-(C - )'
With constant marginal cost and seller's probability assessment exogenous, the right hand
expression is zero so the equilibrium occurs at the monopoly output.
26. Under the assumptions of Theorem 2, the reduced form equation for profits under
overcharge damages takes the form:
n = [R-(C - I)'1X[(1-ON)I(1-W)1 + (C - J)'X - (C - 1).
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3. Factors Promoting Deterrence.. Antitrust damage remedies deter
anticompetitive behavior in two ways: by making cartel formation unprofit-
able and by altering the incentives facing the cartels that do form. When the
benchmark conditions of Theorem 2 are present, all deterrence derives from
the profit constraint, because any cartel profitable enough to form will select
the monopoly output. When cost functions and demand curves vary from
the benchmark assumptions, overcharge damages add to the deterrence
created by the profit constraint by inducing cartels to increase output above
monopoly levels.
The equilibrium output lies above the monopoly level when underlying
marginal revenue is less than marginal cost in terms of real resources eval-
uated at the equilibrium output (R + XR' = (C - J)' < 0). Hence, for
example, the efficient output X° must exceed the monopoly output because
equation (6) implies that R + XR' - (C - J)' = XR' < 0. The ratio T,
defined in equation (9), forms a natural test statistic measuring the increase
in output above the monopoly level induced by the damage remedy. T is
defined in terms of preferences and costs in the absence of antitrust, the
vantage from which welfare can be assessed.
T = [R + XR' - (C - J)'/XR' (9)
The statistic T is an increasing function of output. T will equal zero at the
monopoly output, will be negative at outputs below the monopoly output,
will rise to unity at the efficient output, and will exceed unity at outputs
greater than the efficient output. In figure 4, when output lies between the
monopoly and efficient levels, T is the ratio of segment b to the sum of
segments a and b.
When the buyer is uninformed and overcharge damages are employed,
the test statistic takes the form indicated in equation (10).
T = [(0 - 0),(C - J)"]/[(1 - @)R'] + (10)
[R - (C - J)']/R'uX{[(['/(1 - q5/u)] - [0'/(1 - Oy)]}
This test statistic is used to derive the effect of several factors upon equilib-
Under the assumption of an uninformed buyer, 0 = 0. Under the assumption of constant
marginal cost, (C - J) - (C - J)'X equals fixed costs of production F. Hence firm profits
may be written:
n = [R - (C - J)']X(1- Ou) - F.
If 0 is an exogenous constant, profits will be maximized when [R - (C - J)']X is maximized,
that is, when the difference between total revenue and total variable cost is maximized. Maxi-
mizing this quantity is equivalent to maximizing profits in the absence of antitrust. As with a
pure profit tax, the buyer continues to maximize pre-antitrust profit despite the imposition of
the damage remedy.
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Figure 4. Derivation of the test statistic measuring the effect of private antitrust damages on
industry output.
rium output when overcharge damages are employed, including the curva-
ture of marginal cost, the elasticity of underlying demand, and differences
between the seller's and buyer's probability assessments. 27
First, the effect of changing the curvature of marginal cost on output with
overcharge damages will be isolated by assuming that the seller's detection
probability is exogenous ( ' = 0). Under this assumption, the test statistic
has the same sign as (C - J)". Decreasing returns to scale will unambigu-
ously increase T above zero, raising cartel output above the monopoly level.
This occurs because decreasing returns to scale lowers the output that max-
imizes overcharge damages, displacing the damage function depicted in
figure 3 to the left of the pre-antitrust law profit function and raising the net
27. The effect of social cost savings from coordinated production and the effect of differences
between the sensitivity of seller and buyer's probability assessments to changes in output are
treated elsewhere (Baker).
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profit maximizing output above the monopoly level. 2 The seller raises output
to avoid the region of highest marginal damages.
Second, increasing the slope of the underlying demand curve (raising IR'l)
heightens the influence of overcharge damages on cartel behavior. A less
elastic demand curve raises the seller's expected damage payment in the
neighborhood of the monopoly output, thereby inducing him to raise output
even farther above the monopoly level. Third, the deterrent effect of over-
charge damages increases as the buyer becomes less well informed (holding
marginal probabilities constant). The more the buyer's damage recovery is a
windfall, the less his market demand increases above underlying demand on
account of a prospective antitrust recovery, and the less the seller's expected
damage payment will be rebated back to him in the form of an increase in
demand.
4. Detrebling Overcharge Damages.. Some suggest that the treble
damage multiple is too high and typically propose a reduction to single dam-
ages. In the present model, reducing the damage multiple to single damages
has two effects. First, the profit constraint is no longer binding, so cartel
formation is never deterred. Antitrust law then imposes no bar to the creation
of both harmful price-fixing arrangements and beneficial joint ventures. By
contrast, under treble damages no cartels will form unless their enforcement
probability is less than one-third; all high-detection probability cartels in-
stead choose the competitive output. Therefore the welfare consequences of
detrebling relative to the current system depend in part upon whether the
high-detection probability cartels that form under single damages but would
have been unprofitable under tremble damages choose an output level above
or below the competitive output.
Second, detrebling alters the profit-maximizing output of profitable car-
tels. Thus, the welfare effects of detrebling also depend in part upon the
effect of lowering the damage multiple on the equilibrium output of the low-
enforcement probability cartels that are profitable to form under both single
and treble damages.
The welfare analysis of the effects of detrebling begins with an examination
of the behavior of joint ventures and cartels that are allowed to exist under
single damages but are deterred by the treble damages remedy. The welfare
consequences of allowing the formation of cartels made profitable by detre-
bling can be assessed by examining whether such cartels produce more than
the competitive output, because the seller will act competitively if cartel
formation is deterred. If the output of undeterred cartels is less than the
competitive output, then society is worse off under detrebling. If instead
28. While decreasing returns to scale also reduces the gap between the monopoly output
and the efficient output, the welfare effects of overcharge damages depend upon the relation
between the damage-maximizing output and the monopoly output, not upon the relation be-
tween the monopoly and the efficient outputs.
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cartel output is greater than the competitive output, welfare is improved by
detrebling.2
The test statistic H, defined in terms of preferences and costs in the
absence of antitrust, measures whether cartel output will exceed the com-
petitive output. The notation C'(XC) = - emphasizes that the competitor's
marginal cost (that is, marginal cost evaluated at the competitive output) is
assumed to be constant, independent of the seller cartel's choice of output.
H = (R - y)IXR' = -y + [(C -J)'- -y]/XR' - 1 (11)
H will be positive if and only if cartel output is greater than the competitive
output. 3° Under the assumption that the seller's and buyer's probability as-
sessments are exogenous, this test statistic takes the following form for over-
charge damages:
H = [(0-q )X (C - J)" +(I - Opu) ((C - J)' - 1][1- OuI)XR'] - 1 (12)
The factors that encourage high-enforcement probability cartels to choose
output levels above the competitive level under single damages can be iden-
tified from equation (12). High enforcement probability cartels (such that 0
- 0 -- I/3) are those which were deterred under treble damages but which
single damages make profitable. Assuming that the buyer is less well in-
formed than the seller (0 < 0) and that the damages multiple is one, the
test statistic will most likely be positive when a cartel faces decreasing re-
turns to scale in production ((C - J)" positive), when demand is elastic (IR'
small), and when social cost savings from coordinated production are large
((C - J)' < y). The first two conditions limit a cartel's incentive to raise the
price above the competitive level, and the last condition requires that joint
ventures be socially productive. If most industries satisfy these conditions,
it is plausible that treble damages deter socially valuable joint ventures more
than they deter socially wasteful cartels.
Detrebling has a second consequence for social welfare. Reducing the
damage multiple alters the incentives facing low-enforcement probability car-
tels, namely those which would form under both single and treble damages.
The effect of detrebling on the output of low-enforcement probability cartels
can be determined by examining the effect of detrebling on the test statistic
T under the assumption that enforcement probabilities are less than 1/3.
Under the most plausible assumptions, cartel performance will be worse after
29. The unlikely possibility that a joint venture will create cost savings so large as to cause
cartel output to exceed the efficient output is ignored.
30. When cartel output exceeds the competitive output, the value of the marginal unit of
output, R(X), will be less than the marginal cost of that unit, y. As R' < 0, H will be positive.
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detrebling because the expected damages function depicted in figure 3 is
lowered at all output levels, reducing the net profit-maximizing output X,
closer to the monopoly output X'. This will be true under overcharge dam-
ages if seller production is characterized by decreasing returns to scale and
if the buyer is less well informed than seller.31
Taking into account the effect of detrebling on both existing and potential
cartels, the welfare consequences of detrebling overcharge damages are am-
biguous. The change in welfare from detrebling depends importantly upon
the distribution of all potential cartels with respect to the ex ante probability
of successful enforcement. If most potential cartels are deterred by treble
damages because they are easy to detect and convict, the primary welfare
effect of detrebling depends upon whether most industries are characterized
by elastic demand, decreasing returns to scale, and potentially large cost
savings from coordinated activity: if most industries have these characteris-
tics, detrebling will improve welfare by encouraging beneficial joint ventures.
If instead most potential cartels are not likely to be detected and convicted,
so that they are not deterred by treble damages, detrebling will most likely
reduce deterrence and reduce welfare. Thus, if detrebling were the only
policy alternative to treble damages, it would be particularly desirable if
cartels are unlikely to form (because coordinated behavior is easily detected),
if cartel pricing has little effect on welfare (because industry demand is elas-
tic), and if the potential joint cost savings from coordinated production are
large. However, the benefits of detrebling in any particular industry and in
the economy as a whole cannot be evaluated without empirical evidence on
these factors.
3. EFFICIENT ANTITRUST DAMAGE REMEDIES
3.1. DERIVATION OF THE CLASS OF EFFICIENT REMEDIES
This section derives the class of continuous damage remedies that leads to
an efficient resource allocation under private antitrust enforcement. A rem-
edy that fines sellers substantially at all outputs except the competitive out-
put is not continuous and is excluded from consideration.32 The analysis
assumes risk neutrality of both buyer and seller, but allows for the endo-
geneity of the detection and conviction probability.
31. When 0 -- 0 < Va, so cartels form under both single and treble overcharge damages,
T will be larger under treble damages than under singles damages if and only if
[(0-O)(C - J)"]/R' > 0.
32. This remedy requires too much information on the part of the antitrust enforcer to be
applied successfully in practice. (Block and Sidak). The assumption that the damage remedy
must be continuous also excludes overcharge damages with a very large multiple, although such
a regime would create substantial deterrence of anticompetitive activities. The exclusion is
necessary because no finite damage multiple will generate complete deterrence if buyers are
fully informed.
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This article formalizes and generalizes the analysis found in the literature
on efficient antitrust damage remedies. That literature derives the efficient
damage remedy for the uninformed buyer case only (Landes: 6 5 3 -57).1 By
contrast, the remedy derived below applies when both seller and buyer have
private information and when some or all of that information is revealed
through market behavior.
The class of continuous damage remedies yM*(X) that leads to an efficient
allocation of resources consists of those remedies that allow output to satisfy
simultaneously the equilibrium condition (4) and the condition defining ef-
ficient resources allocation (6). The resulting class of damage remedies takes
into account the endogeneity of seller and buyer probability assessments and
the social cost savings of joint production.
MuM* s.t. XR' = (0-0),uM' + (0'-O')pM (13)
By integrating equation (13) and imposing the initialization condition that
the damage remedy requires no transfer if the seller acts efficiently (that
,uM(XO) = 0) 34 the efficient remedy indicated in equation (14) is derived.
The notation S(X) = : R(t)dt is employed.
IM* = [(So - XORO) - (S - XR)]I(o -0) (14)
To interpret the efficient remedy tM*, it is first necessary to recognize
that R is the demand curve in the absence of antitrust, based upon buyer's
underlying preferences. S represents underlying aggregate consumer will-
ingness to pay, and S - XR defines the consumer's surplus in the absence
of antitrust. Thus, the efficient remedy applies a multiple of 1/(0 - 0) to a
damages base equal to the difference between the consumer's surplus at the
efficient and the equilibrium outputs.35
The base of the efficient damage remedy, M*, consists of the foregone
consumer's surplus resulting from the cartel's failure to act competitively.
This amount equals the sum of the transfer from consumers to producers
and the portion of the allocative efficiency (deadweight) loss that would have
gone to consumers. In short, the expression represents the net harm the
33. Landes recognizes that buyer information may alter the efficient remedy derived for the
uninformed buyer case, although he does not undertake further analysis (654 n.3, 674-77).
34. This initialization ignores the possibility that sellers behaving competitively could be
wrongly convicted of anticompetitive activity. If the normalization were made about another
point, such as the competitive output, the efficient remedy would still lead the seller to choose
the efficient output. The resulting equilibrium would require buyers to subsidize sellers, how-
ever, and firms would earn supranormal profits at the efficient output.
35. The profit constraint does not require separate analysis, as it will always be satisfied at
the equilibrium (efficient) output when the efficient remedy is imposed. -
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seller's cartel causes others.3 The shaded area in figure 5 depicts the damage
base defined by equation (14).
Multiplying the net harm to others by the difference between the seller's
and buyer's probability assessments makes the expected damage payment
equal to the expected net harm the seller causes others. Only the portion of
the seller's expected damage payments not returned to the seller through
the price increase attributable to a rise in buyer demand forms an expected
cost to the seller, so the appropriate multiple equals the inverse of the dif-
ference between the seller's and the buyer's probability assessments.
The efficient antitrust damage remedy leads to efficient resource allocation
by correcting an externality created by cartel behavior, the allocative effi-
ciency loss. By forcing the seller to bear the entire harm to the buyer from
cartel behavior, the efficient damage remedy ensures that the seller inter-
(C- J)'
R
X X°
Figure 5. Base of the efficient damage remedy.
36. The "net harm to others" formulation is implicit in Gary Becker's externality analysis of
efficient punishment (1968: 191-93). It was first systematically applied to antitrust damages by
Landes (656).
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nalizes the entire social cost of his behavior. He is forced to act as a social
planner, comparing the total social costs of his behavior with the total social
benefits. This remedy is efficient regardless of the endogeneity of buyer and
seller probability estimates, 37 of the curvature of the seller's cost function,
or of the extent of social cost savings from joint production among sellers.
Theorem 3 summarizes the discussion of the efficient remedy.
Theorem 3. Efficient resources allocation is generated by the following
antitrust damage remedy: charge the seller with the foregone consumer's
surplus resulting from his restriction of output below the efficient level,
multiplied by the inverse of the difference between the seller and buyer's
ex ante assessments of the probability of detection and conviction.
If it were possible to apply the efficient damage remedy with precision in
every case, no firm would choose to act anticompetitively. All joint ventures
creating social cost savings would form, but none would restrict output below
the competitive level. Competition policy would be enforced through ex post
judicial review of decentralized firm decisions without the tradeoff familiar
from overcharge damages between achieving social cost savings from joint
production and deterring cartel pricing.38
3.2. IMPLEMENTATION DIFFICULTIES
A system of public antitrust enforcement, awarding government enforcers
rather than private plaintiffs the authority to seek damages, is the most
practical way to institute the efficient remedy.39 By institutionally mandating
the uninformed buyer case, four potential implementation difficulties are
avoided. First, only under public antitrust enforcement can courts observe
37. It is evident from equation (14), however, that the efficient damage remedy is undefined
if the buyer and seller have identical probability assessments. Theorem 1 provides an alternative
proof of this assertion.
38. With enough information and computational power, a central planner could always en-
sure efficient production and pricing ex ante. The informational burden of applying the efficient
antitrust damage remedy derived here is significantly less than would be involved in having
government enforcers determine and announce efficient production levels ex ante. To apply the
efficient decentralized remedy, a court must be able to determine the efficient output ex post
if any particular joint venture is challenged. The court'need not make an ex ante economy-wide
determination of efficient output levels.
39. Breit and Elzinga (1973; 1974; 1985) have also proposed public enforcement as a way
to eliminate victim's prelitigation incentive to increase purchases from antitrust violators, as
well as for other reasons. Some of the benefit of public enforcement could instead be obtained
by "decoupling" private antitrust damages, for example by charging the violator treble damages
while allowing the successful plaintiff (victim) to collect only single damages (with the remaining
damage payment given to the U.S. Treasury) (Polinsky). The greater the difference between
multiples applied to violator payment and victim recovery, the more decoupling obtains the
deterrence benefits of public enforcement, but the more the damage system sacrifices the
"private attorney general" incentive embodied in private enforcement.
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the price R(X) which would have obtained in the absence of antitrust law.
With the buyer's probability assessment equal to zero, R must equal the
observable market price P. Second, constraining the buyer's probability as-
sessment to equal zero means that in determining the efficient damage mul-
tiple a court need do no more than make a rough unbiased guess as to the
seller's ex ante detection probability assessment, based largely upon whether
the seller attempted to hide the anticompetitive practice. 40 Otherwise, a
court must estimate the small difference between buyer and seller's proba-
bility assessments, a far more difficult task.
Third, constraining the buyer's probability assessment to equal zero rules
out the informed buyer case, in which no efficient remedy is possible. Finally,
this institutional arrangement rules out the possibility that the buyer's prob-
ability assessment exceeds the seller's, and thus the possibility that the buyer
will be required to subsidize the seller under the efficient damage remedy.
Three problems apply to implementing the efficient damage remedy in
any form. First, a court must determine a substantial segment of both the
demand and the supply curves in order to estimate reliably the foregone
consumer's surplus. This task may require the use of technical expertise to
evaluate econometric evidence. 41
Second, the efficient remedy implicitly requires that those competitors
who do not choose to form a cost-saving joint venture pay a penalty equal
to the foregone consumer's surplus resulting from their failure to achieve
joint production economies. If instead the efficient damage remedy is en-
forced with an exception for competitors, output will be indeterminate be-
cause firms can maximize profits either by acting efficiently or by acting
competitively (Landes: 651).42
The final difficulty arises if the damage remedy is limited to a public
recovery. This limitation reduces the "private attorney general" incentive
embodied in private enforcement and limits the avenues for victim self-
protection. Victims could still seek injunctions barring anticompetitive prac-
tices, however (and would continue to recoup attorneys' fees when such suits
are successful). Further, if the public damages remedy successfully deters
anticompetitive behavior, private injunctive relief should never be necessary.
40. The finder of fact must also examine the seller's likely ex ante evaluation of whether the
practice would have been illegal under the antitrust law applicable at the time of violation.
When antitrust law has changed since the time of the violation, the seller's probability assess-
ment could be low if the practice was arguably legal under the antitrust law enforced at that
earlier time, even if the practice was overt.
41. One institutional arrangement circumventing this difficulty would employ the Federal
Trade Commission's technical expertise to evaluate econometric evidence by awarding the FTC
the exclusive jurisdiction to initiate and adjudicate public damages actions.
42. In order to make the efficient output more profitable than the competitive output, it is
necessary to subsidize joint ventures, although the subsidy need not be large. The subsidy must
be independent of the output actually chosen by seller in order to leave unaltered the incentives
created by efficient damages.
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4. CONCLUSION
The private treble damages remedy for antitrust violations has been both
condemned and defended for its ability to deter violations and compensate
victims. In this article I have shown that under one extreme assumption-
the absence of private information concerning the likelihood of a successful
antitrust recovery-neither treble damages nor any private damage remedy
can accomplish either goal. So long as antitrust violators possess some private
information, however, some private damages remedy (not necessarily treble
the overcharge) creates complete deterrence, renders compensation unnec-
essary, and promotes efficient resource allocation.
An efficient remedy for antitrust violations could be implemented through
public enforcement. If instead the policy alternatives are limited to a choice
between single and treble damages, as it is sometimes posed, the economic
efficiency criterion suggests that detrebling is preferable to the present rule
only when cartels are easy to detect and demand is elastic (suggesting that
anticompetitive behavior is neither likely to occur nor likely to be damaging)
and when the potential joint cost savings from coordinated production are
large. These are, however, the opposite assumptions from those animating
antitrust law.
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